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GET A WARRANT: THE SUPREME
COURT’S NEW COURSE FOR
DIGITAL PRIVACY RIGHTS AFTER
RILEY V. CALIFORNIA
ALAN BUTLER
INTRODUCTION
The Roberts Court will likely be remembered for its decision to
uphold the Affordable Care Act, its same-sex marriage-rulings, and its
decisions in First Amendment and corporate-speech cases; but this
Court should also be remembered for ushering in the era of digital
Fourth Amendment rights. The Court has not only addressed how
Fourth Amendment standards will apply to changing communications
technologies, it has also gone out of its way to learn and understand
how new technologies will affect the balance of power between the
government and citizens. We have come a long way from Chief Justice
Roberts’ question during oral argument in City of Ontario, California
v. Quon: “[M]aybe everyone else knows this, but what is the difference
1
between a pager and e-mail?”
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1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, City of Ontario, Ca. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010)
(No. 08-1332). We have also moved past the arguments about a “tiny constable” in Justices
Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that late-18th-century situations are not
analogous to modern cases and rejecting Justice Scalia’s contention that it might have been
possible to “imagine a case in which a constable secreted himself somewhere in a coach and
remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the movements of the coach’s owner,”
quibbling that “this would have required either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or
both”).
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In Riley v. California the Court answered—in a unanimous, nineto-zero decision—the question of whether the police must obtain a
warrant prior to searching an individual’s cell phone incident to a
lawful arrest. The Court said, simply and unequivocally, yes, “get a
3
warrant.” Moreover, the Court directly addressed the impact of everexpanding digital storage, the proliferation of smartphones, and the
implications of encryption and access to cloud-based services. The
opinion reflected the Court’s newfound understanding of modern
communications technologies and their impact on civil rights. It stands
as one of the strongest and clearest proclamations of Fourth
Amendment rights in the Court’s history.
This article will explore the implications of the Riley decision on
future Fourth Amendment cases, including cases challenging the bulk
collection of telephone metadata. The article will review the
background of Riley and the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, and
describe the new categorical rule adopted by the Court. The article
will then consider how the Riley decision will affect lower court
rulings on important Fourth Amendment issues: the scope of the
search-incident-to-arrest and border-search exceptions, whether the
collection of metadata and location information is a search, and the
rules governing seizure of electronic records.
I. THE COURT’S DECISION IN RILEY
On June 25, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion
in companion cases Riley v. California and United States v. Wurie,
written by Chief Justice Roberts with a concurring opinion by Justice
Alito. Both cases presented the question of whether “the police may,
without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized
4
from an individual who has been arrested.” The Court ultimately held
that the warrantless search of a cell phone seized during a lawful
arrest was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment.
The two cases arose from slightly different factual circumstances.
In Riley v. California, the defendant, David Leon Riley, was arrested
for “possession of concealed and loaded firearms” in his car,
5
uncovered by police during a traffic stop. Riley was searched incident
to the arrest and officers seized several items in his possession,
2.
3.
4.
5.

134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
Id. at 2495.
Id. at 2480.
Id.
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including the cell phone in his pocket. Both sides agreed that Riley’s
7
phone was a “smart phone.” A detective later “went through” the
defendant’s cell phone at the police station “looking for evidence” of
8
gang-related activity. Several videos and photographs from the phone
were introduced as evidence in a criminal case about an unrelated
9
shooting that took place several weeks earlier. Specifically, the State
of California introduced photos and videos taken from the phone as
evidence that Riley “committed those crimes for the benefit of a
criminal street gang, an aggravating factor that carries an enhanced
10
sentence.”
Riley moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his cell
phone, arguing that it was the fruit of an unreasonable warrantless
11
search that violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court
denied his motion to suppress, and he was subsequently convicted.
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, relying on a
12
recent opinion, People v. Diaz, from the California Supreme Court,
which had held that an officer could search an arrestee’s cell phone
incident to arrest if the phone was “immediately associated with the
13
arrestee’s person.” Riley petitioned for review by the California
Supreme Court, which was denied, and he subsequently filed a
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
14
which was granted on January 17, 2014.
In
United
States
v. Wurie, the
defendant, Brima
Wurie, was arrested after a police officer observed him making “an
15
apparent drug sale from a car.” The officers later seized two cell
16
phones from Wurie at the police station. The phone at issue was a
“flip phone” and thus did not have the same advanced capabilities as
17
the smart phone at issue in Riley. After the officers seized Wurie’s
phone, they noticed that it was receiving numerous calls from a
6. Id.
7. The Court defined this as “a cell phone with a broad range of other functions based on
advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity.” Id.
8. Id. at 2480–81.
9. Id. at 2481.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011).
13. Id. at 93.
14. 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014) (granting certiorari).
15. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. Both Riley and Wurie were decided in the same opinion here
denominated simply as “Riley v. California.”
16. Id.
17. Id.
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contact labeled “my home” according to the external call indicator.
The officers opened the phone and went through the call logs and
contacts in order to identify the phone number designated as “my
19
home.” They also saw a photograph of “a woman and a baby set as
20
the phone’s wallpaper.” Using an online directory, the officers were
21
able to use the phone number to obtain Wurie’s address. Based on
that address, officers obtained a warrant to search his apartment,
where they discovered drugs, paraphernalia, cash, a firearm, and
22
ammunition.
Wurie was charged with drug and firearm-related crimes, but he
moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was the “fruit of an
23
unconstitutional search of his cell phone.” The district court denied
24
his motion and he was later convicted. A divided panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit subsequently reversed
the trial court decision, finding that cell phones are “distinct from
other physical possessions that may be searched incident to arrest
25
without a warrant.” The United States filed a Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, which was granted, along with the Petition in Riley, on
26
January 17, 2014.
A. The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception
As the Court noted at the outset, the “ultimate touchstone of the
27
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Under the reasonableness
standard, a search “undertaken by law enforcement officials to
discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing” generally requires “the
28
obtaining of a judicial warrant.” A warrantless search is only
reasonable “if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant
29
requirement.” One such exception is a search “of the accused when
legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
(2006)).
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2482.
Id.
Id.
134 S. Ct. 999 (2014) (granting certiorari).
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (quoting Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403
Id. (quoting Veronia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)).
Id.
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30

crime.”
The Court’s decision in Riley is the most recent in a long line of
cases outlining the boundaries of the search-incident-to-arrest
exception. The Court previously established the boundaries of this
31
exception in three cases: Chimel v. California, United States v.
32
33
Robinson, and Arizona v. Gant. In Chimel, the Court held that
there was “ample justification . . . for a search of the arrestee’s person
and the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that phrase
to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a
34
weapon or destructible evidence.” The justification for this exception
was twofold: (1) to protect the arresting officer and prevent escape,
35
and (2) to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.
The Court later clarified this rule in Robinson, finding that the
physical inspection of an object discovered during the search of the
arrestee’s person is permissible, regardless of “the probability in a
particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be
36
found upon the person of the suspect.” As the Court noted in
Robinson, this rule was largely pragmatic: “A police officer’s
determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect
whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which
the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each
37
instance into an analysis of each step in the search.” For more than
twenty years after Robinson, lower courts applied few limitations on
the scope of searches within the “zone of immediate control” of an
38
arrestee. Then in Gant, the Court applied the Chimel rule to the
search of a vehicle and found that police could search a vehicle under
the exception “only when the arrestee is unsecured and within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
39
search.” However, the Court found that a separate exception would

30. Id. (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1913)).
31. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
32. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
33. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
34. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63.
35. Id.
36. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
37. Id.
38. The Court clarified in Chadwick that the Robinson rule did not apply to physical
containers that were not “immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (holding a locked footlocker could not be searched
incident to arrest).
39. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009).
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allow for the search of a vehicle “when it is ‘reasonable to believe
evidence related to the crime of arrest might be found in the
40
vehicle.’”
Prior to Riley, lower courts applying the Chimel and Robinson
rules were split over whether the exception permitted officers to
search photos, call logs, messages, and other data stored on a cell
phone. Some courts viewed this as a straightforward application of
Robinson—any phone found within the arrestee’s zone of control
41
could be searched and inspected without further justification. But
other courts disagreed, finding that the Chimel justifications were not
applicable to the search of digital files stored on a cell phone—those
files did not pose a threat to the officer and there was no risk of loss
42
of evidence once the phone had been secured. The Court in Riley
was faced with a clear question: should modern cell phones be treated
differently than other objects in the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine
and, if so, why?
B. The New Digital Rule
The Court’s unanimous opinion in Riley answered the narrow
question as clearly and forcefully as possible: yes, cell phones must be
subject to different rules than other physical objects within the
43
search-incident-to-arrest exception. Whereas the default rule for
inspection of physical objects under Robinson had been that no
44
warrant is required for a physical search incident to arrest, the
default rule for searches of cell phones under Riley is “get a
45
warrant.” But what is most interesting about Riley is the Court’s
40. Id. (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment)).
41. Three courts prior to Riley had held that cell phone searches incident to arrest were
categorically permitted under the Robinson rule. See United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405,
411–12 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1353 (2007); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 510 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94
(2011). Three other courts had ruled that certain files on a cell phone could be searched incident
to arrest, without reaching the question of whether other types of files could be subject to
search. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012) (search to obtain the
phone number of the seized cell phone); Commonwealth v. Phifer, 979 N.E.2d 210, 216 (Mass.
2012) (search of recent call list); Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924, 926 (Ga. 2012) (search of text
messages limited in scope).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2013); Smallwood v. State, 113
So. 3d 724, 735–36 (Fla. 2013); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 956 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 102 (2010).
43. Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2490–91.
44. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
45. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
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clear articulation of the important differences between Fourth
Amendment protections for digital devices, as opposed to physical
objects, because this reasoning will likely be applied to evaluating
searches affecting a wide range of new technologies.
At the outset, the Court acknowledged that the application of the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to cell phones is significant because
these devices “are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life
that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an
46
important feature of human anatomy.” The Court went on to
recognize the evolution and widespread adoption of cell phones and
more sophisticated smartphones that are “based on technology nearly
inconceivable just a few decades ago, when Chimel and Robinson
47
were decided.”
As a result of these technological changes, the Court found it
necessary to evaluate the cell phone search issue as a possible new
exception to the warrant requirement. Rather than applying
Robertson directly, the Court approached the issue “by assessing, on
the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
48
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” As the Court
noted, the balancing of interests in Robinson favored a “categorical
rule” exempting all physical searches conducted incident to arrest, but
“neither of its rationales has much force with respect to digital
49
content on cell phones.” The Court proceeded to describe the key
difference between the physical and digital search cases: “Cell phones,
however, place vast quantities of personal information literally in the
hands of individuals. A search of information on a cell phone bears
little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered in
50
Robinson.”

46. Id. at 2484.
47. Id. This is a key point: the Court’s old precedents, adopted prior to the development of
this new technology, are not directly applicable to the current situation.
48. Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
49. Id. Specifically, the Court was not convinced that, absent an immediate, warrantless
search of cell-phone content, that officer safety would be threatened, or that digital evidence
would be destroyed. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485–88.
50. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
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C. Strong Privacy Interests in Digital Data
After reviewing the governmental interests at stake in the searchincident-to-arrest context, the Court went on to consider the privacy
51
interests at stake when officers search an arrestee’s cell phone. The
Court found that cell phones are different “both in a quantitative and
a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an
52
arrestee’s person.” The Court also recognized that most modern
devices “are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the
53
capacity to be used as a telephone.” In sum, the “immense storage
capacity” of the devices combined with their multifunctional nature
fundamentally alters the privacy interests at stake. This portion of the
Court’s opinion in Riley, more than any other, will likely be
remembered as a foundational invocation of digital Fourth
Amendment rights.
To support its conclusion that digital devices are fundamentally
different than physical objects, the Court first addressed the practical
limits of physical searches. Those searches had traditionally been
“limited by physical realities and tended as a general matter to
54
constitute only a narrow intrusion on privacy.” But unlike physical
containers, cell phones can contain “millions of pages of text,
55
thousands of pictures, and hundreds of videos.” Phones can also
store unique data, such as internet browsing history, that never exists
in physical form. The Court also predicted that “this gulf between
physical practicability and digital capacity will only continue to widen
56
in the future.”
The Court went on to address the “interrelated consequences for
57
privacy” of the increasing storage capacity of mobile devices. The
Court found it significant that increased storage capacity enables the
consolidation of many different types of information, which could
58
“reveal much more in combination than any isolated record.” The
Court also noted that the aggregation of photos or other files, along
51. See id. at 2489 (noting that “[a] conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s
pockets works no substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may make
sense as applied to physical items, but any extension of that reasoning to digital data has to rest
on its own bottom”).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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with timestamps and associated metadata, would reveal a great deal
59
more than individual physical items ever could. Similarly, the
archival nature of stored data, providing a record that traces back to
the purchase of the phone and potentially beyond, makes a search of
the digital device much more invasive than a search of a physical
60
object. And finally, the Court concluded that the pervasiveness of
modern cell phones, which most users now carry with them at all
times, means that the privacy cost of allowing routine searches of cell
phones is much greater than the cost of “allowing them to search a
61
personal item or two in the occasional case.”
The Court went on to emphasize that highly sensitive records are
now routinely stored on mobile phones, and that these records are
“qualitatively different” from what would have been available during
a physical search. The Court found that the highly sensitive data
includes “Internet search and browsing history,” “[h]istoric location
information,” “transaction records,” as well as data from a variety of
62
new mobile “apps” that relate to private activities and interests. Cell
phones contain such a wealth of data, the Court reasoned, that “a cell
phone search would typically expose the government to far more than
63
the most exhaustive search of a house.” Cell phones also provide
access to sensitive personal information stored on remote servers, and
law enforcement would have no clear way to distinguish between
64
locally and remotely stored data.

59. Id. (“The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a thousand
photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a
photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.”).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2490.
62. Id. (“Mobile application software on a cell phone, or ‘apps,’ offer a range of tools for
managing detailed information about all aspects of a person’s life. There are apps for
Democratic Party news and Republican Party news; apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling
addictions; apps for sharing prayer requests; apps for tracking pregnancy symptoms; apps for
planning your budget; apps for every conceivable hobby or pastime; apps for improving your
romantic life.”).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2491. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) And Twenty-Four Technical Experts And Legal Scholars In Support Of Petitioner at
12–14, 20, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (Nos. 13-132, 12-212), 2014 WL 975497 at
*12–14, 20 [hereinafter EPIC Amicus Brief].
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C. General Warrants and the Broad View of Fourth Amendment
Rights
Before reaching its final conclusion, the Court considered the
various “fallback” positions offered by the United States and
65
California. The Court rejected these alternative standards because it
found that they would impose no meaningful limitations on cell
phone searches and would be impractical to administer. In this regard,
the Court preferred to adopt a rule “done on a categorical basis—not
66
in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officers.”
The Court concluded by addressing the likely impact of its
decision and the importance of the underlying constitutional interest
67
that it will serve. The Court acknowledged that its decision “will
68
have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime,”
69
but also that, “[p]rivacy comes at a cost.” The warrant requirement is
“not merely ‘an inconvenience to be somehow weighted against the
70
claims of police efficiency.’” Rather, the Court recognized, the
Fourth Amendment is a critical safeguard, “the founding generation’s
response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of
the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through
71
homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.”
If there was any question about the breadth of the Court’s opinion
in Riley, it was answered by the Court’s sweeping quotation of Boyd v.
72
73
United States in the final paragraphs of the opinion. The Court
noted that opposition to warrantless searches “was in fact one of the
65. Id. at 2491–93. The United States proposed that the Court adopt the “Gant standard”
and allow officers to search cell phones “whenever it is reasonable to believe that the phone
contains evidence of the crime of arrest.” Id. at 2492. The United States alternatively proposed
an officer should be allowed to search the phone when she “reasonably believes that
information relevant to the crime, the arrestee’s identity, or officer safety will be discovered.”
Id. And finally, the United States suggested that officers should at least be allowed to search an
arrestee’s cell phone “call log.” Id. at 2492–93. California suggested “a different limiting
principle, under which officers could search cell phone data if they could have obtained the
same information in a pre-digital counterpart.” Id. at 2493.
66. Id. at 2492 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981)).
67. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493–94.
68. Id. at 2493.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)).
71. Id. at 2494.
72. 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (quoting John Adams’s account of James Otis’s speech,
“‘Then and there,’ said John Adams, ‘then and there was the first scene of the first act of
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was
born’”).
73. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.
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driving forces behind the [American] Revolution,” and that John
Adams had described a speech by James Otis decrying writs of
assistance as “the first scene of the first act of opposition to the
arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
74
Independence was born.” The Court then emphasized that, “Modern
cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all
they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans
75
‘the privacies of life.’” The Court’s decision in Riley is based on a
recognition that these digital devices are as deserving of protection as
our homes and private spaces, if not more so.
The Riley decision will have important implications for future
Fourth Amendment cases, especially search-incident-to-arrest cases,
electronic-search-and-seizure cases, and metadata cases. The effects of
the Court’s decision will be immediate and most substantial in searchincident-to-arrest cases, but could support significant doctrinal
changes in electronic-search-and-seizure as well as metadatasurveillance cases. In particular, Riley could influence the outcome of
two major Fourth Amendment issues being considered by state and
federal courts: whether (1) the collection of location records or (2) the
bulk collection of call detail records constitute a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment.
II. SEARCH-INCIDENT-TO-ARREST CASES POST-RILEY
The Court’s decision in Riley will have the most obvious and
immediate impact on future search-incident-to-arrest cases. Lower
76
courts were previously divided over the question presented in Riley,
but now the Supreme Court has made clear that officers must obtain
a warrant, absent exigent circumstances, prior to searching a cell
77
phone that is seized during an arrest. However, there are still several
78
related issues that lower courts will have to sort out in future cases.
First, lower courts will have to decide whether there are exigent
circumstances that would justify an officer’s failure to obtain a
warrant prior to searching an arrestee’s cell phone. Several of the
74. Id. (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625).
75. Id. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630).
76. See cases cited supra notes 41–42.
77. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.
78. This article will not discuss the application of the good faith exception in post-Riley
cases. For a discussion of the good faith exception, see generally Susan Freiwald, The Davis
Good Faith Rule and Getting Answers to the Questions Jones Left Open, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH.
341 (2013).
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hypothetical concerns outlined by the State of California and the
Solicitor General in their briefs before the Court might be reframed
as exigent circumstances if they have a factual basis in a particular
case. These include: threat of the destruction of data and risks to
officer safety due to an arrestee’s communications with an
accomplice. However, the Court was quick to dismiss these arguments
in Riley due to their lack of factual basis, and there is currently no
evidence showing that these concerns are present in real world cases.
It would be difficult for an officer to establish some real threat of
injury or loss of evidence in most cases.
Second, lower courts will likely have to apply the Riley rule in
search incident to arrest cases involving the seizure of computers and
other electronic devices. This will be the most straightforward
application of the Riley decision. The Court’s opinion made clear that
modern phones are computers, and provided no basis to distinguish
79
between different types of digital devices. The Court also explicitly
adopted a categorical rule, rejecting the government’s proposal for a
case-by-case approach to evaluating searches incident to arrest
80
involving digital devices. And even before the Court issued its
decision in Riley, lower courts had been treating cell phones and
computers as indistinguishable for the purposes of the search81
incident-to-arrest analysis. Thus, any court considering a search
incident to arrest involving a computer or other digital device will
almost certainly apply the Riley categorical rule.
Thirdly, lower courts will also likely consider the implications of
Riley in cases involving exceptions to the warrant requirement that
are similar, but not identical to, the search-incident-to-arrest
exception. In particular, lower courts will have to decide how Riley
impacts border search and seizure cases involving digital devices.
Under the border search doctrine, as established by the Court in
82
United States v. Ramsey, a warrant is typically not required for a
search conducted at the border, and such searches have been deemed

79. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
80. Id. at 2491–92.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 805–06 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Judges
are becoming aware that a computer (and remember that a modern cell phone is a computer) is
not just another purse or address book.”); United States v. Phillips, 9 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1141
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014) (“A modern cell phone is a computer . . . .” (quoting Wurie, 728 F.3d
at 8)); Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 735 (2013) (“[T]he search of Smallwood's computerlike device violated the Fourth Amendment.”)).
82. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
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“reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the
83
border.” However, the Ninth Circuit recently held in United States v.
84
Cotterman that a “forensic examination” of a digital device at the
85
border requires reasonable suspicion. But some courts have not
86
embraced this standard. The Court’s reasoning in Riley, that searches
of digital devices implicate significant privacy interests, could provide
a basis for lower courts to adopt the Cotterman rule in future border
search cases.
87
For example, in United States v. Saboonchi, the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland considered the impact of
the Riley decision on its earlier ruling on the scope of Fourth
Amendment protections for cell phones and other devices at the
border. In the earlier holding, the court adopted a Cotterman-like rule
that “forensic” searches of cell phones and other devices at the border
88
can only be conducted based on reasonable suspicion. The court’s
89
definition of a “forensic search,” differed somewhat from the
definition in Cotterman, but the rule it adopted was essentially the
same. The defendant in Saboonchi moved for a reconsideration of
that decision after Riley, arguing that the court should adopt a
categorical warrant requirement for searches of cell phones at the
90
border. The court in Saboonchi ruled that its “forensic search” rule
was supported by the Court’s findings in Riley, about the increased
privacy interests in digital data, but that the Riley decision did not
overturn the “long history of the border search doctrine” cases that
have declined to impose any standard higher than reasonable
91
suspicion. This ruling is consistent with the view that the Court’s
83. Id. at 616.
84. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013).
85. Id. at 967–68.
86. See Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“I would agree
with the Ninth Circuit that, if suspicionless forensic computer searches at the border threaten to
become the norm, then some threshold showing of reasonable suspicion should be required.
Now, however, ‘locking in a particular standard for searches would have a dangerous, chilling
effect as officer’s often split-second assessments are second guessed.’”).
87. United States v. Saboonchi, No. PWG–13–100, 2014 WL 3741141 (D. Md. Jul. 28,
2014) [Saboonchi II].
88. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 569 (D. Md. 2014).
89. Id. (“I also do not define a forensic search in terms of the amount of data that is
recovered, thereby leaving the status of a given search to be resolved later by Customs officers.
Cf. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967. A forensic search is a different procedure, fundamentally, from a
conventional search. It occurs when a computer expert creates a bitstream copy and it analyzes
it by means of specialized software.”).
90. Saboonchi II, 2014 WL 3741141 at *4.
91. Id.
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reasoning in Riley supports the adoption of a reasonable suspicion
standard for forensic searches at the border, similar to the rule
articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Cotterman.
Finally, lower courts will face cases where searches incident to
arrest lead to the seizure of unique physical objects and quasi-digital
devices. The application of Riley in those cases could prove difficult.
For example, the federal district court for the Northern District of
Illinois recently analyzed the reasonableness of Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) searches following an initial stop and seizure of the
92
defendant’s vehicle in United States v. Correa. The court in Correa
considered whether the recent Supreme Court decisions in United
93
94
States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines provided a basis to find that
the use of seized garage door openers and keys to identify the
defendant’s apartment was a “search” under the Fourth
95
Amendment.
In Correa, the officers “discovered a bag on the front passenger
seat” of the defendant’s vehicle “containing four garage door openers,
96
three sets of keys, and four cell phones.” The officers subsequently
drove through the surrounding neighborhood testing the garage door
openers until one of the devices opened the garage of an apartment
97
building. The officers then used the key fob from the bag to gain
access to the lobby of the apartment building and tested the keys
from the bag on various mailboxes until they found one that
98
matched. The officers searched the apartment with the defendant’s
consent, and discovered contraband and other evidence that was
99
ultimately used to convict him.
In analyzing the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence
found in the apartment, the court considered whether the use of
electronic garage door openers to identify the defendant’s apartment
building constituted a search. In a prior decision (pre-Jardines), the
court in Correa had denied the motion and found that the facts were

92. United States v. Correa, No. 11-cr-0750, 2014 WL 1018236 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2014).
The search of the defendant’s vehicle in Correa was technically a consent search, but the
circumstances were similar to a search incident to arrest.
93. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
94. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
95. Correa, 2014 WL 1018236 at *3.
96. Id. at *1.
97. Id.
98. Id. at *2.
99. Id.
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analogous to those considered by the Seventh Circuit in United States
100
v. Concepcion. The officers in Concepcion used keys seized from the
defendant to enter his apartment building and tested the keys on
101
various doors until they found a match to his apartment. The court
in Concepcion concluded that the use of the key to test the
defendant’s apartment door was a “search,” but that “the privacy
interest at issue was so small, the agents did not need a warrant (or
102
even probable cause) to conduct the search.” The court in Correa
rejected the defendant’s argument that the use of the garage door
opener was meaningfully different from the use of the key in
Concepcion or the use of other investigative techniques to identify the
103
defendant’s apartment building.
The court specifically rejected the defendant’s argument in Correa
that the use of the garage opener was equivalent to a digital
104
“trespass,” which would make it a search under Jones and Jardines.
The court distinguished the facts in Correa from those cases on the
grounds that the garage door opener had been lawfully seized
incident to arrest, citing the Seventh Circuit’s recent cell phone search
105
incident to arrest case.
In Correa’s case, even if [the DEA Agent] “searched” the garage
door openers by pressing their buttons to see if they worked, he
did so after lawfully seizing the garage door openers as evidence.
For that reason, this case is much more like United States v. Flores–
Lopez . . . a case decided by the Seventh Circuit after Jones, and on
106
facts more analogous to Correa’s case.

But the Supreme Court rejected that premise in Riley, finding that
the categorical rule used by the Seventh Circuit and other courts was
107
not valid in the context of digital devices. The question now is would
Riley support a different outcome in cases like Correa? One portion
of the Court’s opinion in Riley seems to indicate that it might.

100. United States v. Correa, No. 11-cr-0750, 2013 WL 5663804, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17,
2013) (citing United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172–73 (7th Cir. 1991)).
101. Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1171.
102. Id. at 1173.
103. Correa, 2014 WL 1018236 at *6. The court also noted in a footnote that although the
defendant did not challenge the use of the electronic key fob to enter the apartment building,
they saw “no real distinction between the use of a metal key and an electronic one.” Id. at *5
n.1.
104. Id. at *3.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012)).
107. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
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As the Court noted in Riley, the search of an arrestee’s cell phone
is necessarily broader than the search of physical objects found on his
person because cell phones now routinely provide access to remotely
108
stored files. Allowing the officer to search remote files from the
phone, the Court noted, would be “like finding a key in a suspect’s
pocket and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock and
109
search a house.” Yet that is almost exactly what the lower courts
allowed in Correa and Concepcion. The question for future courts will
be whether the combination of Jones, Jardines, and Riley prohibits the
use of electronic keys and other devices in ways that reach to the level
of “trespass.”
III. THE IMPACT OF RILEY ON THE NSA METADATA CASES
Perhaps the most interesting and controversial question raised
after the Court’s decision in Riley is what impact, if any, the decision
will have on pending challenges to the National Security Agency’s
(NSA) bulk collection of telephone call records under section 215 of
110
the USA PATRIOT Act (the metadata cases). Plaintiffs in the
metadata cases have already argued that the Riley decision supports
the adoption of a new Fourth Amendment rule governing the
collection of call detail records and other metadata, including cell
111
phone location data. The government’s primary argument in these
cases has been that the collection of non-content information held by
third party telephone providers is not a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment, based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith v.
112
Maryland. Courts must now decide whether Smith, a case decided in
the pre-digital era, provides a basis for rejecting privacy interests in
phone and internet metadata in the present day. The Supreme Court’s
113
decision in Riley did not directly address that question, but the
Court’s reasoning provides strong support for a new approach to
analyzing metadata searches under the Fourth Amendment.

108. See id. (citing EPIC Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at 12–14, 20).
109. Id.
110. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-58, 2001, § 215, 115 Stat. 272,
287–88 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861).
111. See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief, Smith v. Obama, No. 14-35555, at 30–31 (9th Cir.
filed Sept. 2, 2014).
112. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
113. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473.

BUTLER 5.27.15 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/24/2015 5:20 PM

DIGITAL PRIVACY RIGHTS AFTER RILEY V. CALIFORNIA

99

A. The DOJ Argument in Favor of Bulk Metadata Collection
There are three major cases arising from challenges to the NSA’s
bulk collection of telephone metadata currently pending before
114
federal appellate courts: Klayman v. Obama (D.C. Circuit),
115
American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper (2nd Circuit), and Smith
116
The NSA Metadata Program, at issue in
v. Obama (9th Circuit).
these cases, is conducted pursuant to orders by the Foreign
117
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). These FISC orders have
been issued based on applications filed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) for “Certain Tangible Things for Investigations to
118
Protect Against International Terrorism.”
119
Under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, the FBI may apply for
an order for “the production of business records and tangible things”
when it has “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things
are relevant to an authorized investigation” to protect against
120
international terrorism. The Business Record (BR) Orders issued by
the FISC in the metadata cases require telephone companies to
conduct “ongoing daily production to the [NSA] of certain call detail
121
records or ‘telephony metadata’ in bulk.” Call detail records include
the time, duration, and numbers dialed and received for every call, as
122
well as other identifying and routing information. These FISC BR
Orders have been issued to major telephone carriers on an ongoing
123
basis since at least 2006. Plaintiffs in all three cases are Verizon
114. No. 14-50005 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 9, 2014).
115. No. 14-42 (2nd Cir. filed Jan. 6, 2014).
116. No. 14-35555 (9th Cir. filed Jul. 1, 2014).
117. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible
Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573 (FISC Aug. 29, 2013)
[hereinafter Eagan Opinion].
118. These applications are filed pursuant to 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a) (West 2014).
119. Codified at 50 U.S.C.A § 1861 et seq.
120. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(2)(A). The FBI can also seek an order for tangible things
relevant to “obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person” or
to protect against “clandestine intelligence activities.” Id.
121. Eagan Opinion, supra note 117, at *1.
122. As the FISC defines it, “telephony metadata” includes “comprehensive
communications routing information, including but not limited to session identifying
information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile station
Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number,
etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call.” Id. at *2
n.2.
123. See, e.g., Eagan Opinion, supra note 117. In June of 2013, an unredacted BR Order was
published by the Guardian, revealing that Verizon Business Network Services was a recipient of
one of these BR Orders in 2013. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of
6,
2013),
Millions
of
Verizon
Customers
Daily,
THE GUARDIAN (June
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124

customers who allege that their call detail records have been
collected under this program in violation of their Fourth Amendment
rights.
In response, the Government has argued that (1) plaintiffs lack
standing to challenge the bulk collection of domestic telephone
records by the NSA, (2) federal district courts do not have the
authority to override the FISC determination that the FBI
applications satisfied the statutory requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1861,
and (3) the plaintiffs’ challenges are foreclosed by the Supreme
125
Court’s decision in Smith v. Maryland. It is the last argument that is
most likely to be impacted by the Court’s recent decision in Riley.
The Government’s Fourth Amendment arguments are essentially
126
the same in the three metadata cases : collection of domestic call
detail records pursuant to FISC BR Orders does not violate plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment rights because (1) under Smith v. Maryland
plaintiffs have no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in call data sent
to a phone company; (2) the telephone metadata records collected by
the NSA do not contain sensitive information; and (3) the postcollection use limitations imposed by the FISC are sufficient to
127
protect user privacy interests. But the Court’s decision in Riley
undercuts all three of these arguments.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order. Senator
Diane Feinstein later confirmed that Verizon, AT&T, and Sprint have all received BR Orders
on an ongoing basis since 2006. Dan Roberts & Spencer Ackerman, Senator Feinstein: NSA
Phone Call Data Collection in Place ‘Since 2006’, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/court-order-verizon-call-data-dianne-feinstein.
124. The Plaintiffs in Klayman and Smith are Verizon Wireless customers, which
complicates matters somewhat because the FISC BR Order disclosed last year was directed to
Verizon Business Network Services, a subsidiary of Verizon Communications that was acquired
during the 2006 acquisition of MCI. See Company Overview of Verizon Business Network
Services, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/
private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=4259068 (last visited Jan. 20, 2015). The Government has
already argued in the Smith case that the plaintiff cannot prove her metadata was collected. See
Brief of the United States, Smith v. Obama, No. 14-35555, at 38 (9th Cir. filed Oct. 2, 2014)
(“But there is no evidence in the record that the government has acquired metadata from
Verizon Wireless under the Section 215 program, let alone that it would do so in the imminent
future.”).
125. See Brief for the Appellees, Smith v. Obama, No. 14-35555 (9th Cir. filed Oct. 2, 2014);
Government Appellants’ Opening Brief, Klayman v. Obama, Nos. 14-4004, 14-5005, 14-5016,
14-5017 (D.C. Cir. filed July 14, 2014); Brief for Defendants-Appellees, ACLU v. Clapper, No.
14-42 (2nd Cir. filed Apr. 10, 2014), 2014 WL 1509706.
126. See cases cited supra notes 115–117. All three briefs use the same structure (the
language in the Smith brief is slightly different, but the substance is the same).
127. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellees at 41–47, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 14-42 (2nd
Cir. Filed Apr. 10, 2014), 2014 WL 1509706 at *41–47.
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B. Application of Riley in the Metadata Cases
The Court in Riley did not directly address whether the collection
of telephone metadata in bulk from a service provider would
constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. In fact, in the
soon-to-be-infamous Footnote 1, the Court explicitly noted that it had
128
not addressed that issue in Riley. But the Court’s reasoning may
very well prove persuasive to lower courts deciding the metadata
cases. In each of these cases the courts will consider (1) whether the
“third party” rule established in Smith v. Maryland still applies in the
context of modern telecommunications networks, (2) whether the
type of metadata generated and collected today is sensitive enough to
trigger increased privacy interests, and (3) whether post-collection
rules limiting the use of collected metadata alter the Fourth
Amendment analysis.
1. Smith v. Maryland, like Robinson, Could Be Overturned
Because of Changes in Technology.
Lower courts faced with this question may very well depart from
the Smith v. Maryland doctrine based on changes in technology, using
the same reasoning as the Court in Riley. The Court’s opinion made
clear that digital communications devices implicate broader privacy
interests than do physical objects and other traditional types of
129
records. In particular, the Court found that data stored on cell
phones is both quantitatively and qualitatively different from the
130
types of physical objects found on an arrestee’s person. The Court
also found that the pervasive use of modern cell phones implicates
broader privacy interests because allowing access to that data would
131
impact the privacy rights of all Americans.
Similarly, both the type and volume of communications records at
issue in the metadata cases are fundamentally different from the pen
132
register records at issue in Smith v. Maryland. In Smith, the Court
considered whether law enforcement’s use of a device to record the
numbers dialed on the defendant’s phone line without a warrant
128. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 n.1 (2014).
129. Id. at 2491.
130. Id. at 2489.
131. Id. at 2490.
132. The “pen register” used in Smith v. Maryland was a “mechanical device that records
the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial
on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate
whether calls are actually completed.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1.
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133

violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court emphasized the
“limited capabilities” of the pen register and the limited scope of what
it could collect, which was a significant factor in determining whether
the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in that
134
information.
Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from
the use of a pen register whether any conversation took place. These
devices do not hear sound. They disclose only the telephone numbers
that have been dialed—a means of establishing the connection. Pen
registers in the 1970s did not disclose the purport of any
communication between the caller and recipient, their identities, or
135
even whether the call was completed.
The Court concluded that most individuals must be aware they
“convey” the phone numbers they dial to the phone company, which
136
may record logs of their calls for billing or other business purposes.
But the evolution of communications technologies since 1979 has
dramatically expanded both the type of information collected about
users by their service providers and the privacy interests at stake in
137
the collection of that data.
2. The Pen Registers Analyzed in Smith v. Maryland Collected a
Very Limited Amount of Call Data
In order to understand the difference between the call data
currently collected by phone companies and the phone records at
issue in Smith v. Maryland, it is helpful to unpack the Court’s accepted
definition of pen register in 1979. The Court in Smith provided a
definition of a pen register in its first footnote, relying on two prior
138
opinions issued in 1977 and 1974. The first was United States v. New
139
York Telephone Company, a case arising out of a telephone
company’s refusal to provide a “leased line” to the FBI in order to
facilitate the off-site monitoring of a target phone line via pen
140
register. The telephone company argued that a pen register could
133. Id. at 739.
134. Id. at 741.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 742.
137. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and
Thirty-Three Technical Experts and Legal Scholars in Support of Appellant, Smith v. Obama,
No. 14-35555 (9th Cir. filed on Sept. 9, 2014), 2014 WL 4678192.
138. Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1.
139. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
140. Id. at 161–64.
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141

only be authorized under a Title III Wiretap Order because the use
142
of a pen register would involve “intercepting” wire communications.
The Court rejected this contention because it found that pen registers
143
“disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed.” The
Court emphasized that, “[n]either the purport of any communication
between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor
144
whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.”
The Court’s understanding of pen registers in Smith v. Maryland
and New York Telephone Co. was derived from an earlier case, United
145
States v. Giordano, a criminal wiretap case where the Court ruled
that the evidence should be suppressed because the Attorney General
146
147
did not properly execute the wiretap applications. Four justices
filed an opinion concurring in part, but dissenting regarding the
suppression of evidence gathered using a pen register on the grounds
148
that the use of a pen register device was “not governed by Title III.”
In Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion, he described a pen register as a
device that “records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from” a target
telephone line, but stressed that “[i]t does not identify the telephone
numbers from which incoming calls originated, nor does it reveal
149
whether any call, either incoming or outgoing, was completed.”
Justice Powell noted that the pen register device and its “mechanical
150
complexities” had been described by the district court below.
141. Title III, which governs wiretapping and electronic surveillance, was first enacted as
part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510–20 (West
2014), and later modified by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–
2710 (West 2014). Under Title III, certain federal and state agents may apply for an order
authorizing the interception of wire or oral communications, and a judge may grant an
interception order as provided in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.2 (10th ed. 2000).
142. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 165–66.
143. Id. at 167.
144. Id.
145. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
146. Id. at 533.
147. Justice Powell, Chief Justice Berger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist.
148. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 503–04 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. Id. at 549 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Other lower court
decisions also emphasize the fact that a pen register was not designed to detect whether or when
a call had been completed. See, e.g., United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich.
1966) (“With reference to incoming calls, the pen register records only a dash for each ring of
the telephone but does not identify the number from which the incoming call originated. The
pen register cuts off after the number is dialed on outgoing calls and after the ringing is
concluded on incoming calls without determining whether the call is completed or the receiver is
answered.”).
150. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The district court opinion is
United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1972).
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As the lower court described, a pen register device at that time
was nothing more than a “decoder” used to detect and translate the
electronic tones that are generated by a phone during its dialing
151
operation. When a number is dialed on a rotary dial phone, like the
one used in the Giordano case, “a switch is opened and closed a
corresponding number of times to the digit dialed which in turn
interrupts the direct current on the line and causes the voltage of the
152
electrical current to rise or fall the corresponding number of times.”
The pen register is installed on the phone line and “counts the
number of pulses in the electrical energy caused by the changes in
voltage, and causes the digit dialed on the telephone to be printed in
153
Arabic numerals corresponding to the number of electric pulses.”
The mechanism for decoding touch-tone phone dialing was slightly
154
more sophisticated, but the result was the same.
With that in mind, imagine the situation considered by the Court
in Smith v. Maryland. Officers were called to investigate a robbery on
March 5, 1976, and the victim provided a description of the robber
155
and a vehicle seen near the scene of the crime. Police later spotted a
man fitting the description driving a similar vehicle in the victim’s
neighborhood and, based on the license plate, learned that the car was
156
registered to the defendant. The police contacted the phone
company and requested that a pen register be installed on the
157
defendant’s home phone line. That same day, the pen register
recorded a call made from the defendant to the victim; the defendant
was later charged and convicted based on the phone call and other
158
evidence. So the call log would have looked something like:
(555) 555-5555 – dialed – (555) 556-5556 – 12:34:56 PM, March 17, 1976

Plus similar entries for any other calls that were placed from the
Defendant’s phone while the pen register device was installed.

151. United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1039–40 (D. Md. 1972).
152. Id. at 1039.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 1040 (“In the case of a touch tone telephone, the press of a button on the face
of the phone activates an electrical oscillator, which generates two alternating electrical currents
at frequencies assigned by the telephone company to correspond to the particular button
pushed. The TR-12 touch tone decoder detects these electrical currents at the varying
frequencies and determines the arabic number to which the various combinations of frequencies
of electrical current have previously been assigned by the telephone company.”).
155. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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But the experience of the officers in the Smith case bears no
resemblance to that of NSA analysts reviewing the millions of
telephone records that are collected each day under the Metadata
Program. The pen-register data at issue in Smith was very limited—
only showing dialed numbers and times without any ability to detect
the duration (or even the existence of) a call. Given that background,
the Court’s holding in Smith was based on a narrow set of factual
circumstances that are not easily generalizable to new digital
metadata records. But the Government now argues that the 1979
holding authorizes the collection of any and all information shared
159
with private companies.
3. Modern Metadata is Different
One key question in the metadata cases will be whether courts
find that the NSA’s collection of metadata today is fundamentally
different from the FBI’s use of pen registers in Smith v. Maryland.
There are several factors that distinguish the NSA program from
anything previously considered by the Supreme Court, but the most
significant is the sheer volume of data. One expert estimates that the
NSA Metadata Program could be generating “140 gigabytes of data”
each day, the equivalent of “70 million pages of information every day,
160
and about 25 billion pages of information every year.” This is only
possible because of the exponential growth in digital storage and the
sophistication of modern databases. Over the last thirty years, the
capacity of computer storage has increased “at a compound annual
161
growth rate (CAGR) of 60%.”
In 1976, the state-of-the-art 5 ¼ inch floppy disk drive had a
162
capacity of 8,000 kilobytes and cost more than $500. Today
companies produce memory products that can store 128 gigabytes of

159. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellees, Smith v. Obama, No. 14-35555 at 37–60 (Oct. 2,
2014).
160. Declaration of Professor Ed Felten at ¶ 11, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-3994 (2nd Cir.
filed Aug. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Felton Declaration], available at https://www.aclu.org/
files/pdfs/natsec/clapper/2013.08.26%20ACLU%20PI%20Brief%20-%20Declaration%20%20Felten.pdf (assuming 3 billion calls are made each day in the United States).
161. E. Eleftheriou, R. Haas, J. Jelitto, M. Lantz, & H. Pozidis, Trends in Storage
Technologies, INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS. COMP. SOC’Y. TECHNICAL COMM. ON DATA ENG.,
Dec. 2010 at 1, avialable at http://sites.computer.org/debull/A10dec/ELE_Bulletin_Dec.pdf.
162. In the Matter of Certain Double-Sided Floppy Disk Drives & Components Thereof at
230–32, Inv. No. 337-TA-215, USITC Pub. 1860 (May. 1986), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=mW8aJDLjowsC&lpg=PA230&ots=QVZqm3c7-g&dq=1976
%20shugart%20FDD&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false.
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163

data on an eleven-by-ten-milimeter chip and hard drive disks that
164
can store eight terabytes of data. That means a hard drive today
could hold more than a million copies of the data stored on a 5 ¼ inch
165
floppy disk. But even the exponential growth in digital storage rates
has not been able to keep up with our ever-expanding demands for
storage capacity. In 2007, the amount of information created and
replicated surpassed the amount of storage capacity available, and
analysts predict that we will see a fifty-fold increase in total data
166
stored from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2020.
The pen register records in Smith v. Maryland were physical
files—paper records created by an automated machine—containing a
very limited amount of information about calls placed from an
individual telephone line. The records collected under the NSA
Metadata Program are massive digital files containing comprehensive
routing and call log information, including: date, time, target number,
trunk identifier, number dialed/calling party number, device
identification number, and duration of call (government officials
claim that they do not currently collect cell site location information
167
for mobile calls). These files contain data about millions of calls
each day, not just the numbers dialed from a single target line. This
metadata, like the cell phone data at issue in Riley, is both
quantitatively and qualitatively different than the physical records at
issue in Smith v. Maryland.
Modern metadata is qualitatively different because it includes
additional fields that provide sensitive information about the caller
and the conversation. Firstly, metadata includes the duration of each
incoming and outgoing call—information that the Court specifically
noted was not present in Smith v. Maryland and the other pen register
cases. The call duration data indicates whether a conversation
163. See Press Release, Toshiba, Toshiba Offers World's Smallest-Class E-Mmc Embedded
Nand Flash Memory Products (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.toshiba.com/taec/news/press_releases/
2014/memy_14_725.jsp.
164. Press Release, Segate, Seagate Ships World’s First 8TB Hard Drives (Aug. 26, 2014),
http://www.seagate.com/about/newsroom/press-releases/Seagate-ships-worlds-first-8TB-harddrives-pr-master/.
165. There are 1,073,741,824 kilobytes in a terabyte, so an eight terabyte hard drive is
roughly 1,073,742 times the size of a 8,000 kilobyte floppy disk.
166. JOHN GANTZ & DAVID REINSEL, THE DIGITAL UNIVERSE IN 2020: BIG DATA,
BIGGER DIGITAL SHADOWS, AND BIGGEST GROWTH IN THE FAR EAST, Dec. 2012 at 3,
available at http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/idc-the-digital-universe-in-2020.pdf.
167. See, e.g., Sample Call Detail w/ Cell Sites, VERIZON WIRELESS LAW ENFORCEMENT
RESOURCE TEAM PRESENTATION at slide 23, available at http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/verizonspy.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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occurred and can also be used to infer to some degree the nature of
168
that conversation. Secondly, metadata includes the trunk identifier
and other routing information that will reveal the general geographic
169
origin of the call. This can reveal not only with whom the user is
communicating, but also when and where they were located when that
communication occurred. Finally, the metadata for wireless calls
includes the unique identification number associated with the phone
170
used. This unique identifier can be used to associate an individual
user with a set of calls, as opposed to an entire household who would
have typically shared a landline phone at the time the Court ruled in
Smith v. Maryland. These differences alone are sufficient to alter the
privacy analysis, but the aggregation of this data allows for much
more invasive techniques.
Modern metadata is also fundamentally different from printed call
logs because of how it is collected and processed. Modern
communications data is stored in structured datasets that facilitate
171
sophisticated link analysis by data-mining programs.
The
combination of advanced processing capabilities with nearly limitless
storage capacity and access to all the daily call records of major
172
carriers allows for “new ways of exploiting the digital record.”
168. See also Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutcheler, Metaphone: The Sensitivity of
Telephone Metadata, WEB POL’Y. (Mar. 12, 2014), http://webpolicy.org/2014/03/12/metaphonethe-sensitivity-of-telephone-metadata/.
169. See Patrick Di Justo, What the N.S.A. Wants to Know About Your Phone Calls, NEW
YORKER (June 7, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/what-the-n-s-a-wants-toknow-about-your-phone-calls (“A cellular network is a ‘trunked’ system: rather than providing
a direct radio link between two phones, callers are linked through a series of high-capacity
channels, typically existing telephone circuits. The trunk identifier of a cell-phone call can reveal
where that call entered the trunk system. This single piece of data can locate a phone within
approximately a square kilometer.”).
170. There are three different identification numbers that can be associated with a phone or
other mobile communications device: IMEI, IMSI, and ESN. The International Mobile
Equipment Identity (IMEI) “uniquely identifies an individual mobile station,” and consists of
“a number of fields totaling 15 digits” with a “range of 0 to 9.” GSM ASS’N, IMEI ALLOCATION
AND APPROVAL GUIDELINES 5 (v.6 2011), available at http://www.gsma.com/newsroom/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/ts0660tacallocationprocessapproved.pdf. The Electronic Serial Number
(ESN) is “a unique identification number embedded or inscribed on the microchip in a wireless
phone by the manufacturer.” ESN Migration to MEIDs, TELECOMM’N INDUS. ASS’N,
http://www.tiaonline.org/standards/numbering-resources/electronic-serial-numbers-esn-andmeid (last visited Nov. 3, 2014). The International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is a “15digit identifier” that “has always been used by GSM systems” but has also been implemented on
other cellular networks across the globe. David Crowe, Cellular Networking Perspectives,
TELECOM
MAG.
(2001),
available
at
http://www.cnpWIRELESS
wireless.com/ArticleArchive/Wireless%20Telecom/2001Q1WT.html.
171. Felton Declaration, supra note 160, at ¶¶ 20–29.
172. Id. at ¶ 24.
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Furthermore, the aggregation and bulk analysis of metadata poses
173
special risks for privacy and associational rights. The government’s
174
use of contact chaining and other relational analysis will necessarily
expose private facts that would otherwise be very costly to obtain, and
it will provide the government with easy access to that information
about millions of innocent individuals who have never been suspected
of wrongdoing. Government regulations are not sufficient to protect
against such broad access.
In Riley, the Court found that the privacy interests at stake in the
search of a cell phone are heightened in part because of the volume of
data stored—the aggregation of which could “convey far more than
175
previously possible.” The Court also found that the type of data
stored on cell phones, including call logs and historical location
records, would reveal sensitive personal information about the user,
and potentially provide access to a “comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her
176
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”
The Court also found that the pervasiveness of cell phone use means
that allowing routine searches of cell phone data “is quite different
from allowing them to search a personal item or two in the occasional
177
case.”
The Court repeatedly emphasized that the practical
limitations of physical searches make them inherently different from
the collection and analysis of digital data. This was the Court’s basis
for departing from the well-established categorical rule from
Robinson—the Court held that digital records are different from
physical objects in the Fourth Amendment context.

173. As the Court noted in Riley, “[t]he sum of an individual’s private life can be
reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions.”
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
174. The term “contact chaining” refers to the process of identifying and mapping everyone
who is within two steps/hops of an individual of interest. See Vladis Krebs, Contact Chaining,
The Network Thinkers (June 28, 2013), http://www.thenetworkthinkers.com/2013/06/contactchaining.html. For example, a contact chaining graph of Alice might show that she contacted
Betty and Carl, and it might also show that Carl contacted David and Elaine and that Betty
contacted Frank and Greg. In that scenario, Alice would be “two hops” from David, Elaine,
Frank, and Greg.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2490 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring)).
177. Id.
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The same reasoning that led the Court to reject the application of
the search-incident-to-arrest exception to cell phone data in Riley
would support the rejection of the Smith v. Maryland rule for digital
communications records.
IV. OTHER SIGNIFICANT FOURTH AMENDMENT AREAS THAT
COULD BE IMPACTED BY RILEY
The Court’s decision in Riley will likely have a lasting impact not
only in search-incident-to-arrest cases and in cases challenging the
NSA Metadata Program, but also in other major Fourth Amendment
cases involving electronic storage and digital communications records.
In particular, the Riley decision will guide lower courts in cases
involving the collection of location data records and in cases involving
the search and seizure of data in electronic storage.
A. Impact of Riley on Location Data Cases
One significant unresolved issue is whether the collection of cell
phone location data is a search subject to Fourth Amendment
178
protections. Lower courts are currently split over the statutory and
constitutional standards applicable to law enforcement requests for
location data. And several federal appellate courts are currently
considering this issue in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
179
Jones. Those courts will now measure the impact of the Riley
180
decision.
In 2005, a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of New York
issued a rare published opinion following an application for a
181
surveillance order. This opinion revealed for the first time that the
178. See generally Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?:
Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress
Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117 (2013) (discussing the constitutional implications of
the collection of cell phone location data.).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d. 1205 (11th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 573 Fed.
Appx. 925, (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Graham, No. 12-4659 (4th Cir. filed Aug. 22, 2012).
180. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief of Appellants, United States v. Graham, No. 12-4659 (4th
Cir. filed Jul. 18, 2014).
181. See In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a
Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or Cell
Site Info., 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). See generally Kevin Bankston, Only the
DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41 U.S.F. L. Rev. 589, 608–12 (2007).
The DEA had previously obtained real-time location information in a case where they obtained
a Title III wiretap. See M. Wesley Clark, Cell Phones as Tracking Devices, VAL. U. L. REV.
1413, 1415 (2007) (discussing United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 856 (2004)).
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DOJ had been routinely seeking authorization to track cell phones in
real time under section 2703(d) of Electronic Communications
182
Privacy Act. The judge ruled that section 2703(d) could only
authorize the compelled production of “information already in
existence” at the time of the application, and could not authorize the
183
ongoing or real-time tracking of a suspect.
Courts have
subsequently authorized the government to collect historical cell
184
phone location data pursuant to section 2703(d), and at least one
federal appellate court has ruled that this construction of the statute
185
does not render it “categorically unconstitutional.”
At issue in the location data cases is the government’s collection
of cell site location information (CSLI). As the Eleventh Circuit
described in Davis,
[t]hat location information includes a record of calls made by the
providers’ customer, in this case Davis, and reveals which cell
tower carried the call to or from the customer. The cell tower in
use will normally be the cell tower closest to the customer. The cell
site location information will also reflect the direction of the user
from the tower. It is therefore possible to extrapolate the location
of the cell phone user at the time and date reflected in the call
186
record.

That location information is similar, but not identical to the data
generated by the tracking device used in United States v. Jones. In
Jones, the Supreme Court held that “the Government’s installation of
a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to
monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search’” under the
187
Fourth Amendment. But the majority opinion in Jones ruled on the
narrower grounds that the government’s physical occupation of the
defendant’s “private property for the purpose of obtaining
information” constituted a search, regardless of whether the
182. Bankston, supra note 181, at 609.
183. In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register and a Trap and Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 312–13 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
184. See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11 (“The evidence at issue consists of records obtained
from cell phone service providers pursuant to the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18
U.S.C. §§ 2703(c) and (d).”).
185. In re Application of the United States, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013). See also In re
Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to
Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a magistrate has
discretion under section 2703(d) to require probable cause before issuing an order for location
data, but that probable cause is not required under the Fourth Amendment in every case).
186. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11.
187. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
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defendant had a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in his location
188
information. The Court in Jones did not directly answer whether the
collection of location data without the use of a physical tracking
device is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. But two
concurring opinions—one by Justice Sotomayor and another by
Justice Alito joined by three other justices—reasoned that the longterm monitoring of an individual’s location would violate a
189
reasonable expectation of privacy.
The state of Fourth Amendment protection for location data is
still uncertain post-Jones, but the Court’s decision in Riley will likely
have a significant impact on future decisions. Unlike Jones Court, the
Riley Court spoke with one voice and clearly outlined the important
privacy interests in cell phone data. The Court also specifically
addressed the sensitivity of location data, invoking the reasoning of
Justice Sotomayor’s far-reaching concurrence in Jones:
Although the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished from
physical records by quantity alone, certain types of data are also
qualitatively different. . . . Historic location information is a
standard feature on many smart phones and can reconstruct
someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only
190
around town but also within a particular building.

The Court found that the privacy interest in location data, as well
as other cell phone data, was so great that it outweighed the
government’s interest in gathering evidence during a lawful arrest,
191
overturning the categorical rule previously established in Robinson.
Defendants in future cases will argue that the Smith v. Maryland rule
should be similarly rejected in the context of stored location data.
And given the Court’s findings on the significant privacy interests at
stake, it would be difficult for a lower court to conclude that an
individual has no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in such sensitive
data.

188. Id. at 950.
189. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
190. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise,
comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”)).
191. Id. at 2493.
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B. Impact of Riley on Electronic Search and Seizure Cases
In a growing number of cases, lower courts must grapple with the
question of when and for how long law enforcement officers are
192
allowed to collect, search, and store digital data. Determining the
proper scope of digital data searches and the identifying reasonable
retention and minimization practices for seized data is a complex
problem; lower courts are likely to consider the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Riley when ruling on electronic search issues. Among these
issues, first: Is the copying of a digital device’s contents a seizure that
triggers Fourth Amendment requirements? Second: Are there limits
to how long law enforcement officers may store seized digital data—
i.e., do they have an obligation to delete the data? And finally, what is
the reasonable scope of a digital data seizure or search—how does the
“plain view” doctrine apply in the digital context? These are all
questions that lower courts will have to answer in future cases; the
Riley decision will likely inform those answers. In particular, Riley
supports the conclusion that the retention of electronic data should be
subject to different Fourth Amendment rules than those used for
193
handling physical evidence. Riley would also support a narrower
construction of the “plain view” exception for digital searches.
Lower courts have not yet resolved whether law enforcement
investigators have any obligations to delete or minimize seized data.
Courts will have to address the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections for seized data in cases where officers obtain a copy of a
hard drive or other storage device in one case, and later attempt to
use evidence gathered from that device in a separate case. For
194
example, in United States v. Ganias, the Second Circuit considered
“whether the Fourth Amendment permits officials executing a
warrant for the seizure of particular data on a computer to seize and
indefinitely retain every file on that computer for use in future
195
criminal investigations.” The investigators in Ganias seized the
defendant’s hard drives pursuant to a warrant in 2003 as part of an
investigation into fraud by two government contractors for whom the
196
defendant performed accounting work. By 2004, the investigators

192. See generally Orin Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119 YALE L.
J. 700 (2010) (discussing recent decisions regarding law enforcement seizure of digital data.).
193. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–91.
194. 755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014).
195. Id. at 137.
196. Id. at 128.
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had “isolated and extracted” files relevant to the contractor case, and
pursuant to the warrant they were “not permitted to review any other
197
computer records.” When the government subsequently expanded
their investigation to include “possible tax violations by Ganias,”
more than twenty months after the initial seizure of the hard drives,
they were still maintaining copies of the non-relevant files from their
198
previous search.
The court in Ganias ruled that the government’s “seizure and
retention” of digital filed beyond the scope of their 2003 warrant was
199
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the court
found that “[w]ithout some independent basis for its retention of
those documents in the interim, the Government clearly violated
Ganias’s Fourth Amendment rights by retaining the files for a
prolonged period of time and then using them in a future criminal
200
investigation.” The court implied that while the government might
be allowed to keep a mirror image of files for the purpose of
maintaining its evidentiary chain of custody, there was no justification
201
to use that data for “any other purpose.” The court’s ruling was
clear: when the government obtains a warrant to search an electronic
storage device for certain evidence, it must extract that evidence
within a reasonable time period, then delete or otherwise prevent the
use of all other data from the seized device.
The rule adopted in Ganias is consistent with the scope of privacy
interests in digital data outlined in Riley, and other courts will be
more likely to adopt the rule in light of the Supreme Court’s decision.
The Court emphasized in Riley that users have significant privacy
interests in the files stored on their digital devices, and that searches
of digital devices “would typically expose to the government far more
202
than the most exhaustive search of a house.” Given the large
volume of sensitive records stored on digital devices, it is necessary to
establish clear limits on the retention and use of data seized pursuant
to a warrant for a specific investigatory purpose.

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 129.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (emphasis in original).
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As the search and seizure of stored electronic data has become
commonplace in criminal investigations, lower courts have also had to
address the application of the “plain view” doctrine to digital
203
204
searches. The Supreme Court previously held in Arizona v. Hicks
205
and Horton v. California that “[i]f an article is already in plain view,
neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of
206
privacy.” But this rule is problematic when applied to seizures of
digital data, as the Ninth Circuit recently discussed in United States v.
207
Comprehensive Drug Testing (CDT). In CDT, the government
argued that it could lawfully retain medical records outside the
narrow scope of what it was authorized to obtain in the warrant
because “that evidence was in plain view once government agents
208
examined” the computer directory. The court in CDT rejected this
argument because, under that theory, “everything the government
chooses to seize will . . . automatically come into plain view. Because
the government agents ultimately decide how much to actually take,
this will create a powerful incentive for them to seize more rather
209
than less . . . .” Furthermore, the court found that it would “render
210
the carefully crafted safeguards” in the warrant “a nullity.”
In Comprehensive Drug Testing, the Government obtained a
grand jury subpoena for all “drug testing records and specimens” held
by CDT pertaining to their administration of Major League
211
Baseball’s drug testing program. The company sought to quash the
subpoena but the same day the motion was filed the government
obtained a warrant to “search CDT’s facilities in Long Beach” that
was “limited to the records of ten players as to whom the government

203. See generally Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV.
531 (2005) (discussing the application of the plain view doctrine to searches of various digital
mediums).
204. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
205. 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
206. Id. at 133 (1990) (citing Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325). As Professor Kerr points out,
“[t]echnically speaking, the plain view doctrine is a limitation on the government’s right to seize
evidence. It regulates seizures, not searches.” Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 203, at 577
n.200. Thus the plain view doctrine might not apply to “searches” of computer files at all if the
court finds no seizure took place, but “no court that has applied the plain view exception to
digital evidence has recognized or even acknowledged this point.” Id.
207. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1170–71 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc).
208. Id. at 1170.
209. Id. at 1171.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1166.
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212

had probable cause.”
However, “[w]hen the warrant was
executed . . . the government seized and promptly reviewed the drug
testing records for hundreds of players in Major League Baseball
213
(and a great many other people).” The players and CDT successfully
moved for return of their property under Federal Rule of Criminal
214
Procedure 41(g), and the government appealed.
The court
ultimately concluded that the Government had wrongfully accessed
data beyond the scope of the original warrant and that, as a result of
215
its intentional wrongdoing, it must return the property to CDT.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in CDT and the Second Circuit’s
recent decision in Ganias both show that the application of the plain
view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
should be narrowly construed in the context of seizures of digital data.
As Professor Kerr has outlined, there are three main approaches to
narrowing the plain view exception in the digital context: first,
“narrow the plain view exception based on the circumstances of the
search, such as the analyst’s subjective intent or the tool used;”
second, narrow the exception based on the nature of the evidence
discovered, permitting the use of some kinds of evidence while
blocking others;” and third, abolish the plain view exception in digital
216
evidence cases.” The court in Ganias adopted a version of the third
approach, following along with the rule outlined by the Ninth Circuit
217
in CDT. But recently some courts have declined to extend the same
protections to data stored on digital devices that are seized pursuant
to a warrant.
218
For example, in United States v. Miller the court considered
whether the forensic search of a digital camera that was seized during
the lawful execution of a search warrant of the defendant’s home
219
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The officers in Miller
obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s home for evidence
220
related to suspected drug and narcotics sales. During the search, an
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1171, 1174.
216. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures, supra note 192, at 576–77.
217. See United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir. 2014)(citing CDT, 621 F.3d at
1171 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)).
218. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, No. 13-20929, 2014 WL 3671062 (E.D. Mich. July 23,
2014).
219. Id. at *1.
220. Id.
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officer inspected a digital camera that was discovered in the
221
defendant’s home. The officer turned on and “examined” the
camera, discovering images that he believed to be child
222
pornography. The police subsequently sought separate warrants to
search the defendant’s house for evidence of child pornography based
223
on the image discovered on the camera. The defendant argued that
the detective’s examination of the camera was outside the scope of
the warrant, but the court ultimately found that the examination was
224
“consistent with an authorized narcotics search.”
The court in Miller rejected the defendant’s argument, made postRiley, that the search of a digital camera is “different” from the search
of a photo album or other physical item that the police could lawfully
225
inspect during the search of a home. The court distinguished Riley
on the grounds that the search of a home pursuant to a warrant
involves a “different mode of analysis” from a warrantless search
226
incident to arrest. The court also reasoned that the search of a
digital camera is different than the search of a smartphone because
cameras only “contain a limited type of data, restricted to image and
video files, that do not touch the breadth or depth of information that
227
a cell phone’s data offers.” The court held that the search of the
camera did not violate the defendant’s reasonable expectation of
privacy because the police “inadvertently discovered Defendant’s
child pornography,” and did not purposefully exceed the scope of the
228
warrant. The court in Miller clearly adopted the “intent of the
analyst” approach to the plain view doctrine in the context of a digital
229
device seized during the search of a home.
These cases, which seem inconsistent upon first inspection, may in
fact fit into a new framework of Fourth Amendment protection for
digital data. When investigators obtain copies of digital data, as in
Ganias and CDT, they will be subject to search and retention
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at *2.
225. Id. at *3.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at *5. The court analogized Miller’s case to United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168
(6th Cir. 2011), and distinguished United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
229. See Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 203, at 576–80 (discussing Carey, United
States v. Gray, 78 F.Supp.2d 524 (E.D. Va. 2009), and problems with the plain view approach
focused on the circumstances of the search).
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restrictions based on the scope of the warrant or authorization. This is
similar to the heightened standard imposed on “forensic” searches at
the border in Cotterman and Saboonchi. However, when officers
discover evidence upon initial inspection of a digital device during an
authorized search, that evidence will be admissible even if it is outside
the scope of the original search, so long as the discovery was
inadvertent or reasonable under the circumstances. This rule would be
necessarily limited because it would not extend to more in-depth
forensic examinations of the digital devices. Any such examination
would require an independent legal justification, similar to the
“forensic search” standard applied by courts in the border search
context.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Riley will likely have a
significant impact on future Fourth Amendment cases involving new
technologies, especially cases involving cell phones and other digital
devices. The first major test of post-Riley Fourth Amendment
standards will likely come in the metadata cases, which are now
pending before three federal appellate courts. Judges in the metadata
cases could find that the “third party” rule articulated in Smith v.
Maryland is inapplicable to modern communications metadata in the
same way that the search-incident-to-arrest rule established for
physical items in Robinson is now inapplicable to cell phones.
Similarly, judges considering whether the collection of cell phone
location information is a “search” could rely on the Court’s decision
in Riley to support the conclusion that individuals have strong privacy
interests in their location records. The Riley decision will likely also
have an impact on border search and electronic search cases. Because
of its potentially broad impact on future cases, the Riley decision will
likely be remembered as a landmark decision for digital Fourth
Amendment rights.

